A U.S. Senate report, released Wednesday morning, disclosed alarming security lapses by the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) during the assassination attempt on former President Trump by Thomas Matthew Crooks on July 13 in Butler, PA. The report, as Senator Richard Blumenthal had warned, highlights the agency’s failure to act despite having 27 minutes of advance warning that Crooks was positioned on a building near the rally, which ultimately resulted in the death of one man and injuries to others.

“At approximately 5:45 pm, USSS personnel were notified that local law enforcement observed a suspicious person with a rangefinder near the AGR building. By 5:52 pm, at least eight USSS personnel had been informed. Approximately two minutes before shots were fired…” the report states.

The report outlines 12 critical points where the Secret Service could have, but failed to, protect the former president and prevent the tragic death of Corey Comperatore, a father and former fire chief. The following are key points from the report:

1. “USSS personnel were notified of a suspicious person with a rangefinder around the AGR building approximately 27 minutes before the shooting,” the report states.

2. “USSS was notified about an individual on the AGR roof approximately two minutes before Crooks fired from the AGR roof.”

3. Despite observing law enforcement running toward the AGR building with weapons drawn, a USSS counter sniper did not alert Trump’s protective detail to remove him from the stage. “The USSS counter sniper told the Committee that while seeing officers with their guns drawn ‘elevated’ the threat level, the thought to notify someone to get Trump off the stage ‘did not cross [his] mind.'”

4. Although USSS counter snipers, including the one who killed Crooks, were deployed due to “credible intelligence” of a threat, many USSS personnel interviewed claimed they were unaware of such intelligence.

5. USSS Advance Agents denied responsibility for security planning failures and were unable to identify who had final decision-making authority.

6. Local law enforcement had expressed concerns about security coverage of the AGR building.

7. USSS personnel had identified several line-of-sight issues at the rally grounds.

8. There were two separate communications centers at the rally—one operated by USSS, the other by local law enforcement.

9. Crooks was in the crosshairs of a USSS counter sniper for “mere seconds” before he fired.

10. Additional resources requested by USSS personnel were denied, which could have enhanced security.

11. The USSS’ Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (C-UAS) faced technical problems and was inoperable until 4:33 pm, after Crooks had flown a drone near the rally site.

12. Several USSS officials reported experiencing technical issues with their radios, which, they told the Committee, is a common occurrence.

The report concluded that these failures were both “foreseeable and preventable,” contributing directly to the events of July 13. The Committee also highlighted communication breakdowns between federal, state, and local law enforcement that remain unresolved, which further contributed to the Secret Service’s inadequate response that day.

Additionally, the report notes that key requests made to the FBI, DHS, ATF, and USSS regarding the investigation remain unanswered. The heavily redacted documents provided by USSS and DHS hindered the Committee’s investigation. These redactions delayed the process of conducting interviews and obtaining crucial information necessary to recommend security reforms.

The Committee identified multiple failures, including the lack of clearly defined responsibilities for planning and security, inadequate coverage of the AGR building, poor coordination with state and local law enforcement, and the failure to communicate critical information about the suspicious person to relevant personnel. These errors collectively resulted in the assassination attempt that day, nearly costing the life of a former—and potentially future—president.